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Regionalism and African agency: negotiating an Economic 
Partnership Agreement between the European Union and SADC-
Minus 
This article investigates the regional dynamics of African agency in the case of 
negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and 
a group of Southern African countries, known as SADC-Minus. I argue that these 
negotiations were shaped by a pattern of differentiated responses to the choice set 
on offer under the EPAs by SADC-Minus policymakers and by a series of 
strategic interactions and power plays between them. I offer two contributions to 
an emerging literature on the role of African agency in international politics. 
First, I argue for a clear separation between ontological claims about the 
structure-agency relationship and empirical questions about the preferences, 
strategies and influence of African actors. Second, I suggest that in order to 
understand the regional dynamics of African agency it is important to pay close 
attention to the diversity and contingency of African preferences and to the role 
of both power politics and rhetorical contestation in regional political processes. 
Keywords: African agency; Economic Partnership Agreements; European Union; 
ACP; Regionalism; SADC. 
Introduction 
In July 2014, six countries in Southern Africa – Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa (known as SADC-Minus) – initialled the text of a 
regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU). This 
was the culmination of one of seven negotiations between the EU and groups of former 
European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), designed to replace 
unilateral European trade preferences with reciprocal free trade agreements. The recent 
agreement in Southern Africa was preceded by a number of significant concessions 
from European negotiators and eschewed much of the EU’s earlier negotiating agenda 
on trade in services and regulatory harmonisation. In the context of the obvious power 
asymmetries involved in a negotiation between the EU and a group of mostly small 
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developing countries, this outcome constitutes an interesting puzzle. This is all the more 
striking because several members of the region – Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Mozambique – had indicated their willingness to sign a more ambitious free trade 
agreement earlier in the EPA negotiating process. In this paper, I seek to explain the 
limited nature of the EPA that was eventually agreed in Southern Africa in spite of 
preferences from both the EU and a number of members of the SADC-Minus region for 
a more comprehensive deal. 
The surprising difficulty that the EU experienced in enforcing its liberalisation 
agenda for the EPA in Southern Africa suggests that this is a useful case through which 
to contribute to a growing literature on ‘African agency’ in international politics.1 
Explorations of African agency and activism in the EPAs to date have stressed the 
relatively uniform and united resistance of African actors to the EU’s neoliberal agenda 
for the negotiations.2 Or else, accounts of the EPAs in Africa have assumed that the 
negotiating positions of African states could be understood purely based on their 
objective material circumstances.3 Both of these approaches, however, provide a poor 
guide to the process and outcome of the EPA in Southern Africa. Here, responses to the 
EPA were neither unified in their resistance to EU-imposed trade and regulatory 
liberalisation, nor did they represent a straightforward reflection of the material 
incentives associated with the negotiations. 
In this article, I argue that responses to the EPA by African policymakers were 
characterised by a range of different interpretations of the choice set on offer, different 
preferences and different negotiating strategies.4 The interaction between these actors 
played out in the context of a region with a weak and fragmented institutional 
architecture and a climate of mutual suspicion between government actors in different 
states. The eventual outcome of the agreement arose from a power play by the dominant 
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regional power, South Africa, which brought the previously divided region into line 
behind the South African government’s negotiating strategy. At the same time, the 
South African government drew concessions from the EU by making strategic 
discursive appeals to both the development needs of its smaller regional partners and to 
the integrity of ongoing regional integration processes. 
In making this argument, I aim to contribute two insights to emerging debates 
about African agency in the context of international politics. First, I seek to clarify an 
important ambiguity running through the emerging African agency literature by 
drawing a clearer separation between ontological considerations of the relationship 
between structure and agency and empirical questions about the ideas, preferences and 
influence of particular actors. Second, I offer a counterpoint to existing accounts of 
African agency in regional contexts, which suggest that regional cooperation may 
‘enhance’ the agency of African actors. Based on the SADC-EPA case, I suggest that 
negotiating as part of a regional configuration may actually make it more difficult for 
some African actors to realise their preferences. Drawing these two insights together, I 
argue that in order to provide a nuanced understanding of the exercise of African 
agency in regional settings it is important to both understand the range of preferences 
that national government agents hold and to trace the ways in which these preferences 
are negotiated and articulated at the regional level. 
The article proceeds in three main sections. First, I present a critical discussion 
of the existing African agency literature. Second, I briefly chart the set of complex and 
ambiguous incentives that faced the ACP countries in the EPA negotiations. Third, I 
present an empirical analysis of the process and outcome of the EPA negotiations in 
Southern Africa. Here, I trace the historical context in which these negotiations played 
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out, the preferences and strategies of key actors and ultimately the process by which a 
limited regional EPA was agreed. 
African agency: reflexivity and regionalism 
In the last five years, ‘African agency’ has emerged as a central research theme for 
those with an interest in Africa’s place in international politics.5 This new ‘African 
agency’ literature can be seen as part of a longer tradition in which Africanist scholars 
have sought to challenge dominant narratives that present African actors as passive 
recipients of external structures and political decisions taken elsewhere. Accounts of 
African activism in the 1990s and into the 2000s stressed the ‘extraversion’6 of African 
elites and tended to take a relatively negative view of the role of African leaders in the 
maintenance of weak and predatory forms of African statehood.7 The more recent 
African agency literature – the main focus of this review – is in general more optimistic 
about the positive and emancipatory potential of African agency. Yet within this new 
literature there are tensions in the way that agency itself has been framed.  
One of the drivers of increased academic interest in African agency has been the 
perception that African actors are becoming more influential in international politics as 
the result of an emerging multipolar world order. In this context, much of the recent 
African agency literature, conceptualises agency as the ability of African actors to have 
a significant impact on international political processes. This literature also often 
equates African agency with resistance to externally imposed policies and ideas and 
perhaps even with the ability to bring about progressive or emancipatory structural 
change. For example, Adrian Leftwich argues that African agency is ‘the capacity of 
agents […] to shape their environment.’8 In the context of the growing activism of the 
emerging powers in Africa, Timothy Shaw argues that ‘African agency constitutes a 
determined response by the continent’s developmental states to [reap] the gains rather 
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than costs of the discovery of Africa’s potential by the BRICS.’9 And Stephen Hurt 
suggests that agency is ‘a way to challenge the dominant material and ideational 
structures of the global political economy.’10  
The conflation of agency (an ontological presupposition) with influence or 
resistance (empirical claims) potentially obscures the variety of preferences and 
strategies taken up by African agents and the range of outcomes that these produce. If 
the focus of the African agency literature falls only on those African actions that are 
expressed in the form of successful influence, contestation or resistance, we may miss 
the wide range of African actions that serve to perpetuate existing structures or that are 
simply geared towards coping and survival within a highly unequal global system.11 
Dieter Neubert and Christine Scherer make a similar criticism, suggesting that the tying 
of agency ‘to emancipatory concepts and visions or as a norm for successful social 
action’ has limited its openness as a concept.12 
To address this criticism, and clarify an important ambiguity running through 
the recent African agency literature, I propose here a clearer separation between 
ontological questions about the relationship between structure and agency and empirical 
questions about specific agents’ ideas, preferences, actions and influence. In so doing, I 
follow social constructivist approaches that stress the importance of reflexivity in their 
conceptualisation of agency.13 Agency, then, can be defined as ‘the ability or capacity 
of an actor to act consciously and, in so doing, to attempt to realise his or her intentions’ 
within the context of uncertain or indeterminate social structures.14 Although African 
actors are frequently placed in materially weak positions within highly asymmetrical 
power structures, these structures do not entirely determine the interpretations and 
responses of purposive African agents.15 Such an approach to African agency 
encourages us to ask empirical questions about how specific actors interpret the 
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contexts in which they are placed, what strategies for action they devise and what 
outcomes these strategies produce. In other words, rather than making prior assumptions 
about the form and impact of African agency, this approach explores empirically the 
contingency and diversity of African responses to structural constraints. 
My focus in this article is on the regional political dynamics of African agency 
and their implications for African interactions with external actors. Regionalisms of 
various types are burgeoning in Africa.16 Much of the existing literature on agency in 
African regionalism focuses on the role of external actors in processes of regional 
cooperation and integration.17 However, an emerging literature examines the agency of 
African actors in and through regional organisations and settings. The most common 
claim within this literature is that regional cooperation serves to ‘enhance [African] 
agency.’18 Thomas Kwasi Tieku, for example, argues that the existence of formalised 
African regional institutions may magnify the voice of African actors, provide political 
backing for African actors on the ground and allow African actors to influence global 
institutions like the UN.19 Here, the assumption is that African agents share a relatively 
unitary set of preferences and the claim is that regional cooperation helps African agents 
to exert influence in line with these preferences. 
Such an assumption may obscure some of the complexity of the exercise of 
African agency in and through regional settings. At first glance, the SADC-Minus EPA 
negotiations appear to constitute a case of unified African influence or resistance 
through regionalism. However, closer inspection reveals that the diversity of 
interpretations, preferences and strategies in relation to the EPA in the SADC-Minus 
region was central to the way that this negotiation played out. Indeed, participation in 
these negotiations as part of a region made it more difficult for some members of the 
region to achieve their preference for a more comprehensive EPA. Further, I aim to 
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show that these preferences cannot be understood purely based on the external pressures 
imposed by the EU, nor on the objective trade position of each country. Instead they 
were shaped by the ideas, interpretations and actions of purposive and strategic agents, 
set within the historical and institutional context of the region.  
The case of the SADC-Minus EPA suggests that the outcome of region-based 
African engagement with international politics depends much upon the interpretation of 
external pressures and the formation of preferences and strategies at the national level – 
in this case by trade policymakers and negotiators.20 Particularly where regional 
institutional structures are weak, the interaction between national governments may be 
shaped by material asymmetries between states and the power dynamics that these 
generate. However, this case also suggests that the outcomes of region-based 
negotiations are contingent upon the strategic moves of the players involved. In the 
SADC-Minus EPA, South Africa was only able to use its economic muscle to bring its 
neighbours into line with its preferences after it shifted its negotiating strategy in 2009. 
Furthermore, I will argue that South African negotiators deployed strategic discourse – 
that is, the use of discourse in pursuit of ends-oriented strategies21 – as a successful part 
of their tactics for extracting concessions from the EU. In sum, the argument put 
forward in the analysis that follows is that the outcome of the region-based SADC-
Minus EPA negotiations can be understood as the result of the specific ideas and 
preferences of national trade negotiators and policymakers in the region and their 
contingent strategic interactions. 
The EPAs: space for African agency 
Before exploring the SADC-Minus negotiations in detail, I first offer some background 
on the choices available to the ACP countries in the EPA negotiations.22 In 1994, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) issued a ruling against the EU’s 
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system of unilateral trade preferences for the ACP countries under the 1975 Lomé 
Convention. European policymakers obtained a temporary waiver for the continuation 
of the Lomé arrangement until the end of 2007, but ultimately decided that the EU’s 
trade relationship with the ACP countries would have to be made reciprocal in order to 
comply with GATT (later World Trade Organisation [WTO]) rules.23 The Cotonou 
Agreement of 2000 set in motion the negotiations for a set of free trade agreements – 
the EPAs – between the EU and regional groupings of ACP countries, to be completed 
before the expiry of the WTO waiver. In addition to the WTO requirement for 
reciprocity in trade in goods, the EU suggested that these agreements should include 
trade in services and agreement on the so-called ‘Singapore issues’ – investment, 
competition, government procurement and trade facilitation. The EU claimed that such 
‘comprehensive’ EPAs would promote the development interests of ACP countries.24 It 
is worth noting that the ACP countries had consistently resisted the inclusion of the 
Singapore issues in multilateral trade negotiations.25 On top of this, the EU also insisted 
that the EPAs include a range of technical provisions, such as a most favoured nation 
(MFN) clause (which would require any tariff reduction agreed with a third party to be 
extended to the EU) and a ban on export taxes. If ACP countries refused to sign an EPA 
by the end of 2007, they would be downgraded to the next best EU preference system 
for which they were eligible – the Everything But Arms scheme for Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs) and the considerably less generous Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) for non-LDCs. 
In 2007, as the expiry of the WTO waiver approached, it became clear that most 
of the ACP regions were not ready to sign full regional EPAs. At this stage, the 
European Commission offered an option for individual ACP countries and sub-regions 
to sign goods-only agreements, which came to be known as ‘interim EPAs’. The 
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intention was that these would provide a stepping stone to ‘full’ regional EPAs that 
would include the EU’s services and regulatory agenda. Following the signature of 
interim EPAs by a number of ACP countries, the negotiations continued well beyond 
2007 and the EU ultimately imposed 1 October 2014 as the final deadline for the 
conclusion of negotiations. 
Over the course of the negotiations, the EPAs brought a series of difficult 
choices for African ACP countries and regions into sharp relief. Some existing accounts 
of the EPAs suggest that ACP countries faced a relatively straightforward set of 
material pressures, which were primarily a function of their existing reliance on EU 
trade preferences and their LDC or non-LDC status.26 I argue, however, that the set of 
material incentives associated with the EPAs was rather more complex and ambiguous 
than these accounts acknowledge. ACP decision makers had to develop interpretations 
of the importance of existing EU trade preferences, the potential future value of these 
preferences, the costs of reciprocity in trade relations with the EU, the value of the trade 
policy autonomy that would be lost by signing an EPA, and the potential costs and 
benefits of cooperation with the EU on its proposed services and regulatory agenda. 
Furthermore, signing an EPA would potentially affect regional trade and diplomatic 
relationships and processes of regional integration. In the following section, I suggest 
that national policymakers in the SADC-Minus region developed quite different 
interpretations of this set of choices. 
Negotiating an EPA in SADC-Minus 
Institutional and historical context in SADC-Minus 
At the beginning of the EPA negotiations in 2002, there were at least seven overlapping 
regional integration projects – SADC, SACU, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, CEMAC and 
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IOC27 – that included Central, Eastern and Southern African countries. To complicate 
matters further, South Africa already had a free trade agreement with the EU – the 
Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) signed in 1999 – and had 
only observer status at the beginning of the EPA negotiations. Because of their 
membership in a customs union with South Africa, the other members of SACU – 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland – were de facto implementing the 
reciprocal trade liberalisation with the EU that South Africa had agreed under the 
TDCA. 
In all, the EPA group based on SADC, which came to be known as SADC-
Minus, contained only seven of the 15 SADC members (see Figure 1). These included 
the members of SACU (initially with South Africa as observer only) plus three non-
SACU members – Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. Tanzania soon left the group to 
join the breakaway EAC configuration. Meanwhile, the members of the SADC-Minus 
group decided not to delegate negotiating authority to a supranational body, instead 
maintaining national competence for the negotiations and coordinating their activities 
through a small and under-resourced ‘EPA unit’.28 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The history of relations between the constituent members of the SADC-Minus group 
added to the complexity of the EPA process. The legacy of South Africa’s apartheid 
regime was a stark pattern of regional economic inequality and ongoing mistrust of the 
regional power. Trade patterns between South Africa and the rest of the smaller SACU 
region are particularly asymmetrical. South African products account for over 70 
percent of import markets in Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, while these 
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markets receive on average less than four percent of total South African exports.29 
Furthermore, SACU’s smaller members remain heavily reliant upon the transfer of 
import revenues from South Africa under the organisation’s revenue sharing pool.30 
South Africa also dominates the wider SADC region in terms of services and 
investment, providing 85 percent of all foreign direct investment in the region.31 In this 
context, the South African government is frequently viewed with suspicion and 
sometimes hostility by governments elsewhere in Southern Africa.32 Tensions within 
SACU in particular were only heightened by South Africa’s lack of consultation with its 
regional partners over the earlier TDCA negotiations.33 
African negotiating positions in the SADC-Minus EPA 
Once the SADC-Minus EPA group had been formalised, the negotiations with the EU 
began in earnest in 2004. In the early phase of the negotiations, the SADC-Minus group 
was keen to set aside regional differences and offer a united front. Following regional 
consultations – in which South Africa played a leadership role despite not yet being a 
full party to the negotiations – the group presented a common negotiating framework to 
the EU in 2006. Central to this was a request that South Africa be admitted to the EPA 
process as a full negotiating party, a move motivated by a desire to harmonise SACU’s 
trading relations with the EU and to draw on the South African government’s previous 
experience of negotiations with the EU.34 The EU granted this request, with the caveat 
that market access negotiations with South Africa would take place separately from the 
rest of the group. The group’s other early demands – for non-reciprocity for the non-
SACU countries and non-binding cooperation on the EU’s services and regulatory 
agenda – were rejected by the European Commission.35 By mid 2007, the region was 
under pressure to sign at least an interim goods-only EPA before the expiry of the WTO 
waiver and at this point divisions began to emerge in the SADC-Minus group. 
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The material implications of the decision about whether to sign an interim EPA 
varied greatly for different members of the SADC-Minus group.36 As already noted, the 
smaller SACU countries – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland – were de facto 
implementing the terms of South Africa’s TDCA with the EU prior to the EPA 
negotiations. For this reason, reciprocity in the EPA and the import tariff liberalisation 
that this implied was not a major concern for these countries beyond a desire to insert 
recognition of specific sensitivities into the existing TDCA tariff phase-down 
schedule.37 For the non-SACU members – Angola and Mozambique – reciprocal 
liberalisation with the EU would have potentially more serious implications. 
The material implications for the SADC-Minus countries in terms of access to 
the EU market also varied considerably. As LDCs, Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique 
could receive duty- and quota-free access to the EU market under Everything but Arms 
even if they refused to sign an EPA. Likewise, South Africa’s EU market access was 
secured under the existing TDCA. Botswana, Namibia and Swaziland all stood to have 
their preferential access to the EU market downgraded to GSP status if they refused to 
sign an EPA before the WTO waiver expired. Such a downgrade would affect these 
countries to different extents depending on their existing level of preference dependence 
(see Table 1). 
[Table 1 here] 
A number of observers have suggested that the material incentives associated with the 
level of a country’s dependence on existing preferences and its eligibility for alternative 
preference schemes are key to understanding the outcome of the EPAs.38 However, the 
negotiating positions of the SADC-Minus members (discussed in more detail below) are 
difficult to square with any straightforward reading of these varied material incentives. 
This is well illustrated by the examples of Namibia and Botswana. In Namibia’s case, 
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36 percent of existing exports were destined to the EU, and of these exports 31 percent 
would be affected by a tariff rise if the country was downgraded to GSP status. This 
made Namibia one of the countries in the region with the most to lose from disruption 
to existing levels of EU market access and yet Namibia consistently registered 
reservations about the EPA process and refused to sign the interim EPA in 2009. 
Contrast this with Botswana, which was much less exposed to material losses in the 
event of the downgrade of its preferential market access. Only 1.5 percent of 
Botswana’s exports to the EU (primarily in the beef sector) would be affected by a tariff 
rise if Botswana were downgraded to GSP. While preference-dependent commodities 
were of marginal importance to the Botswana economy, its government was much more 
enthusiastic about the EPA process than Namibia. Likewise, the cases of Lesotho and 
Mozambique – which were relatively positive about the EPA in spite of their eligibility 
for the alternative Everything but Arms scheme – also present a puzzle from this 
materialist perspective. 
In order to understand the responses of SADC-Minus countries to the offer of an 
interim EPA, it is important to comprehend the frameworks through which African 
agents understood the choice set on offer to them. Specifically, it is useful to draw an 
analytical distinction between those countries within the region that were relatively 
more enthusiastic about the prospect of a comprehensive EPA and those that were more 
sceptical of the entire EPA process. The central point here is not that material concerns 
were irrelevant, but that these material factors were themselves ambiguous, and that 
there were clear differences in the way that actors in these two groups of countries 
interpreted the choice set on offer to them. 
EPA sceptics: policy space versus market access 
South Africa led the group of countries that took a sceptical attitude to the EPAs, which 
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also included Namibia and Angola. These countries shared many of the concerns about 
the EPAs voiced by a transnational group of anti-EPA activists.39 These concerns 
chiefly revolved around the loss of trade policy autonomy – or ‘policy space’ – 
associated with the agreements. 
These concerns aligned with a broad commitment to development and 
industrialisation strategies based on trade interventionism in all three of these countries. 
In South Africa, there had been shift towards greater interventionism in trade policy 
following attempts by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) to draw 
attention to the adverse effects on employment of trade opening under the TDCA and 
the Uruguay Round.40 Subsequently, the South African Department of Trade and 
Industry’s 2007 policy framework emphasised the issue of employment and called for 
trade policy to be married to a ‘robust industrial policy.’41 Namibia’s recent 
development strategy has also prioritised industrialisation and the diversification of the 
country’s economy away from primary agricultural exports and into manufacturing.42 In 
so doing, the Namibian government has deployed a range of interventionist trade policy 
tools.43 The Angolan government, meanwhile, has been pursuing a reindustrialisation 
strategy based on import-substitution since 2002 and has therefore sought to maintain 
protection for domestic industries through relatively high import tariffs.44 
These commitments by the governments of South Africa, Namibia and Angola 
to varying degrees of trade interventionism left them particularly suspicious of the 
impact that the EPA process would have on their autonomy to pursue these types of 
policies. In line with this position, South African Minister of Trade and Industry, Rob 
Davies expressed concern that, ‘The EPAs […] contain legal provisions that limit the 
state’s policy space to promote agricultural and industrial development.’45 While South 
Africa was keen to use the EPA process to improve on the terms of its access to the EU 
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market under the existing TDCA, its government was very reluctant to further open its 
markets to European goods in return.46 Likewise, Angolan negotiators stressed the need 
to create greater production capacity before removing any protectionist trade barriers in 
relation to the EU.47 
Given its existing implementation of the terms of the TDCA, the liberalisation of 
import tariffs posed less of a concern for the Namibian government. However, both the 
South African and Namibian governments were very concerned that a proposed ban on 
export taxes would undermine their strategies for encouraging domestic value addition 
in relation to export commodities.48 Specifically, Namibian Ambassador to the 
European Commission, Hanno Rumpf, suggested that the inclusion of such a ban would 
undermine the Namibian government’s ability to maintain supplies to agricultural 
processing industries, extend value chains, create jobs and defend Namibian companies 
against the ‘rough competitive practices’ of South African firms.49  In addition, the 
South African government expressed concern about the impact of the proposed MFN 
clause on its policy autonomy, suggesting that this would undermine attempts to 
diversify the country’s export markets, particularly towards emerging economies.50 
The South African government – in part responding to pressure from COSATU 
– was also strongly opposed to making any binding commitments on services and 
investment.51 Rob Davies cited the EU’s insistence on the inclusion of trade in services 
and the ‘new generation’ of regulatory issues as the ‘major problem’ with the EPA 
negotiation.52 Negotiators expressed concerns that if South Africa signed up to an 
agreement with the EU that included rules on public procurement and investment the 
state’s ability to pursue key domestic policy aims – including Black Economic 
Empowerment – would be compromised.53 Namibian negotiators also consistently 
opposed the inclusion of trade in services and regulatory harmonisation in the EPAs.54 
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In general, South African, Namibian and Angolan officials viewed the reforms 
attached to the EPAs as concessions to a self-interested EU agenda that would place 
limits on the policy space for interventionist trade measures. These countries viewed the 
EPAs as a process in which concessions in terms of policy space were traded off against 
continued and improved access to the EU market. As the only one of the sceptics in 
danger of suffering a significant loss of EU preferences, Namibia initialled the interim 
EPA at the end of 2007, but attached a letter detailing its reservations and later refused 
to sign the interim deal in 2009.55 South African officials, meanwhile, refused to initial 
the interim EPA in 2007 on the basis that the market access offer from the EU was not 
enough to justify the loss of policy autonomy associated with the agreement.56 The 
Angolan government continued to engage with the EPA process at a rhetorical level up 
to and after 2007 but never submitted a concrete market access offer to the EU and 
therefore never looked likely to sign an agreement.57 South Africa and Namibia 
continued active negotiations with the EU after 2007 (see below) but made it clear that 
they would not be willing to undertake binding commitments on trade in services or the 
EU’s regulatory agenda. 
EPA enthusiasts: win-win liberalisation 
In contrast to the EPA sceptics, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland were 
more receptive to claims about the development benefits of the EPA. These countries all 
initialled the interim EPA in 2007 and signed it in 2009, while also actively pursuing 
negotiations on services and investment up to 2009. Rather than viewing the EPAs as a 
trade-off between market access and concessions to an offensive EU agenda, these 
countries were more inclined to view the comprehensive liberalisation agenda promoted 
by the EU as a boon to development. 
 19 
The perception that comprehensive EPAs would be supportive of development 
can be linked to a rather different set of development strategies in these states than in 
the more sceptical countries. Botswana’s official development strategy paper suggests 
that in order to achieve the country’s development aims, ‘the ongoing liberalisation and 
deregulation of the economy will have to be pursued with more tenacity and vigour.’58 
Central to this strategy is the diversification of Botswana’s economy, with the particular 
aim of creating a regional centre for financial and banking services in the country.59 
Lesotho, meanwhile, has prioritised the marketing of the country as a stable and 
attractive investment destination and widespread reforms in relation to the granting of 
visas and business licenses in order to create an ‘enabling environment’ for private-
sector led development.60 Likewise, the Swazi government has articulated a 
commitment to the ‘free enterprise nature of the Swazi economy’61 and has 
demonstrated this to some extent through recent financial services liberalisation and the 
opening of the telecommunications market to competition.62 As a highly aid-dependent 
country, Mozambique represents a slightly different case to the other enthusiasts. 
Nonetheless, Mozambique’s development strategy has revolved around responding 
positively to the liberal policy agendas of Western donors,63 and it has thus adopted a 
similar range of policies based on economic reform and openness to the global 
economy.64 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland each perceived that there would be a benefit 
from signing the EPA in terms of access to the EU market.  Protection of preferential 
market access for Botswana’s socially and culturally important beef industry was a key 
motivator for signing the interim EPA in spite of the small role of beef exports in the 
Botswana economy as a whole.65 Trade and Industry Minister Daniel Neo Moroka 
explained the decision to sign the EPA by suggesting that a loss of preferential market 
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access for beef would have had an adverse social impact on around 600,000 people in 
Botswana.66 Furthermore, interviewees cited the important lobbying role played by 
representatives of the beef industry in the lead up to the conclusion of the interim 
EPA.67 For Lesotho, the perceived market access benefit of the EPA came in the area of 
rules of origin for garment exports. Although exports to Europe made up only a very 
small part of the country’s trade profile, the Lesotho Government perceived that the 
more generous rules of origin on offer under the EPA would help the country to expand 
this trade.68 For Swaziland, the specific market access benefit of the EPA was much 
clearer because of the country’s acute reliance on preferential access to the EU market 
for its sugar exports.69  
However, the enthusiasts’ motivations for reaching agreement on an interim 
EPA also went beyond market access. These countries had originally requested only 
non-binding cooperation on the EU’s services and regulatory agenda as part of the 
region’s joint negotiating framework agreement of 2006 and under the leadership of 
South Africa.70 However, when divisions began to emerge in the region in 2007, 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland took the opportunity to open negotiations for a 
binding agreement with the EU on services and investment. The EU’s claims about the 
development benefits of liberalisation of services and investment regimes found 
receptive ears in these countries that had already made commitments to development 
strategies based on economic reform, the attraction of inward investment and openness 
to global markets.71 Botswana, in particular, was praised by European negotiators for its 
‘strong leadership’ in the negotiations on services and investment.72 As reasons for this, 
Batswana negotiators cited the desire to diversify the economy beyond the export of 
commodities as well as the current high cost of electricity, water and transport services 
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and a desire to maintain the country’s historically strong investment links with 
Europe.73 
Furthermore, a key motivator for negotiating a binding agreement on services 
and investment for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland was the perception that such a 
deal could help to lessen these countries’ economic dependence on South Africa. 
Lesotho, in particular, viewed a comprehensive EPA was as a way of ‘lessening the 
Kingdom’s acute dependence on South Africa for the supply of goods and services.’74 
This had become a key policy priority for Lesotho in the late 2000s.75 In Swaziland, too, 
officials were keen to secure a move away from reliance on South Africa and they saw 
the EPA as a tool for doing so.76 Batswana officials expressed suspicion that the South 
African refusal to negotiate with the EU on services and investment was motivated by a 
desire to protect its own commercial interests in the region from European 
competition.77 Once the opportunity arose to negotiate a deal on services and investment 
that would exclude South Africa, it was this that proved appealing to the EPA 
enthusiasts because it seemingly offered an opportunity to lessen their reliance on the 
regional hegemon. This helps to explain why these countries would pursue a deal with 
the EU on services and investment in spite of having earlier opposed the inclusion of the 
Singapore issues in multilateral trade talks. 
While the government of Mozambique was also enthusiastic about the EPA and 
willing to negotiate on the EU’s services and regulatory agenda, its case should be read 
slightly differently.78 As a non-SACU member, the country’s market access offer was 
not linked to the existing TDCA. Following some back and forth with the EU 
negotiators, Mozambique made one of the most generous market access offers of any of 
the African ACP countries, with large adjustment costs and only a short lead in time.79 
Mozambique’s eagerness for an ambitious and comprehensive EPA can in part be 
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attributed to its government’s internalisation of donor-promoted neoliberal development 
norms and its consequent sympathies for the EU’s claims about the benefits of 
comprehensive trade liberalisation.80 In addition, given Mozambique’s aid dependence, 
the country was keen to secure access to EPA-related development assistance by 
responding positively to the EU’s demands.81  
The road to a regional EPA 
Until 2009, South Africa’s dominant economic position had tended to work against the 
emergence of a common regional negotiating position, precisely because this 
dominance was a problem for some members of SADC-Minus. In the period after 2009, 
this regional dynamic shifted and this helps to explain why SADC-Minus (with the 
exception of Angola) ultimately reached an agreement that was less ambitious than 
some of the EPA enthusiasts in the region had earlier hoped. Specifically, after 2009 the 
South African government began to more forcefully exert its regional economic 
dominance while deploying a rhetorical strategy designed to extract concessions from 
EU negotiators. That it was able to do so was not a straightforward function of South 
Africa’s economic dominance. Rather, this was a contingent outcome based on South 
African agents’ ability to rhetorically invoke the integrity of SACU and the 
development needs of its smaller regional partners in order to undermine the EU’s EPA 
ambitions.  
The South African government’s strategy following its refusal to initial the 
interim agreement in 2007 was to persuade European negotiators that in order to reach a 
deal in the region they would have to offer concessions on market access for South 
Africa and remove the MFN clause, the ban on export taxes and binding commitments 
on services and investment from the agreement.82 Following the initialling of the 
interim EPA by part of the region in 2007, officials from the South African Ministry of 
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Finance held various discussions with counterparts in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
in which these officials mooted the possible break-up of SACU in the event that the 
region remained divided over the EPA.83 When these countries went ahead and signed 
the agreement in 2009, South Africa stepped up this tactic.  South African trade officials 
threatened to reinforce border checks on goods coming from those countries that had 
signed the EPA and fuelled media speculation that the EPA would lead to the breakup 
of SACU.84 The effect of this strategy was twofold.  
First, South African negotiators were able to place pressure on the other SACU 
members not to go ahead with the ratification of the interim EPA. They did this by 
suggesting that the SACU customs pool on which the smaller SACU members were 
reliant would be threatened by the ratification of the agreement as it currently stood. 
Immediately following the signing of the interim EPA in 2009, South Africa’s chief 
trade negotiator, Xavier Carim, said:  
The impact of this has not been thought through yet, but there could be 
implications for the customs pool and the way customs revenue is shared, because 
the pool functions on the assumption that the common external tariff is intact.85 
In this context, even resolute EPA enthusiast Botswana notified the EU that it would not 
begin implementation of the interim agreement without the support of its regional 
partners.86 Furthermore, after 2009 the enthusiasts ended their active participation in 
services and investment negotiations. In this sense, South Africa’s muscle flexing 
effectively left its smaller partners with little choice but to fall into line with its 
preference for a more limited EPA. 
The second effect of South Africa’s new strategy was that its negotiators were 
able to rhetorically invoke both the integrity of SACU and the development needs of its 
regional partners in order to contest the EU’s negotiating strategy. South African 
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negotiators were keen to stress that regional division was the result of the EU’s 
comprehensive agenda and high-pressure negotiating tactics. For example, Trade 
Minister Rob Davies stated: 
In the SADC region, the major problems have in fact arisen from the EU’s 
ambitions to move the EPAs beyond WTO compatible free trade agreements. […as 
a result] two [countries] have not signed on at all to an arrangement, which, it must 
not be forgotten, is supposed in the first instance to enhance regional integration.87 
The point of this statement was to mobilise a counterargument to the EPAs that 
highlighted the contradictions between the EU’s claimed commitment to regional 
integration and development and its apparently aggressive and divisive negotiating 
agenda and tactics. In this sense, as Lotte Drieghe has argued, the EU became 
‘entrapped’ by its own rhetorical commitments to the promotion of regional integration 
and development through the EPAs.88 
In July 2014, a regional EPA between the EU and SADC-Minus was reached 
(excepting Angola, for which active engagement in the negotiations had effectively 
ceased earlier in the process). The concessions made by the EU in reaching this 
agreement reflect the specific demands made by South Africa (and to a lesser extent the 
other sceptics) during the latter stages of the negotiations. The EU conceded that an 
agreement could be reached without binding commitments on services and regulatory 
harmonisation, in spite of the earlier assertions made by the enthusiasts that they would 
negotiate a deal on these issues.89 The clauses on MFN and export taxes were adjusted 
to address South African and Namibian concerns.90 Finally, the EU offered a number of 
agricultural market access concessions to South Africa in exchange for an agreement on 
Geographical Indications.91 
Ultimately, the South African government’s strong-arm tactics, alongside its 
rhetorical invocation of the EU’s commitment to development and regional integration 
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– rather than the generalised influence or resistance of all African actors in the region – 
was what served to water down the EPA in Southern Africa. Furthermore, this strategy 
actually prevented those countries that were rather more enthusiastic about signing up to 
the EU’s comprehensive liberalisation agenda from doing so. 
Conclusion 
This article aimed to explore the regional dynamics of African agency in the context of 
negotiations for an EPA between the EU and the SADC-Minus countries. The result of 
these negotiations was an EPA that fell considerably short of the EU’s early ambitions 
for the negotiations and even failed to fulfil the desires of some of the SADC-Minus 
countries for a comprehensive free trade agreement. I have argued that these 
negotiations defy notions of African agency as unified influence, contestation or 
resistance as well as simplistic claims that regional cooperation ‘enhances’ African 
agency. Rather, these negotiations were characterised by a pattern of differentiated 
African interpretations and responses to the choice set on offer under the EPAs and a 
series of strategic interactions and power plays between African regional partners. 
These responses took place in the context of a complex regional institutional 
architecture and patterns of historically embedded regional mistrust. They also reflected 
the particular interpretations by elites in different countries of both the choice set on 
offer under the EPA and their positioning within the Southern African regional political 
economy. The ultimate outcome of the EPA negotiations in Southern Africa can be seen 
as a reflection of contingent South African preferences and its negotiators’ ability to 
eventually alter the choice set of other members of the region and to use effective 
rhetorical strategies to extract concessions from the EU. 
In the light of this case, I aimed to contribute two broader insights to the 
growing literature on African agency in international politics. First, notions of African 
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agency as influence, contestation or resistance may mask the variety of African 
responses to particular contexts, incentives and externally imposed policies and ideas. 
Rather, we should treat the commitment to examining agency as an ontological 
presupposition and thus allow space to investigate empirically the different 
interpretations and choices made by African actors in any particular context. Second, 
applying this to the issue of African regional cooperation, I suggested that more 
attention should be paid to both the diversity of African preferences at the sub-regional 
level and to the political dynamics of African regional cooperation. While it is true that 
regional cooperation can enhance the ability of (some) African actors to realise their 
preferences, the case of the SADC-Minus EPA negotiations suggests that regional 
cooperation may make it more difficult for some actors to realise their aims. The 
outcomes of region-based interactions with external actors depend to a considerable 
extent on the configuration of the preferences of the African actors involved, their 
regional power positions and their strategic and rhetorical interactions. 
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Tables 
Table 1. SADC-Minus states’ exposure to loss of Lomé-equivalent preferences. 
Country LDC 
Status 
Proportion of 
Exports 
Destined for 
EU, 2004-2012 
(%)1 
Proportion of 
Exports to EU 
subject to a tariff 
rise if downgraded 
to GSP/MFN 
treatment (%)2 
Key exports to the EU, 
2004-2012 (% of exports 
to EU)3 
Angola Yes 12.8 - Mineral fuels, oils etc 
(94.1); pearls, precious 
stones etc (4.5) 
Botswana No 67.0 1.5 Pearls, precious stones etc 
(96.5); meat and offal (1.3); 
apparel (1.1) 
Lesotho Yes 1.0 - Pearls, precious stones etc 
(76.3); apparel (16.3) 
Mozambique Yes 44.8 - Aluminium (71.5); tobacco 
(6.2); fisheries products 
(4.4); sugars (3.4) 
Namibia No 35.6 30.5 Pearls, precious stones etc 
(44.2); zinc (10.3); fisheries 
products (22.0); copper 
(6.6); ores, slag and ash 
(6.6); salt, sulphur, lime, 
cement etc (2.9); meat and 
animal products (2.1) 
Swaziland No 6.0 86.6 Sugars (78.3); vegetables, 
fruits, nuts etc (14.2) 
Note: Data for Lesotho is limited. Figures cited cover 2008-2010. 
Figures 
Figure 1. SADC-Minus EPA configuration. 
 
 
                                                
1 International Trade Centre, “Trade Map.” 
2 Overseas Development Institute, “The Costs to the ACP of Exporting to the EU under the 
GSP.” Data is available for non-LDCs only. 
3 International Trade Centre, “Trade Map.” 
